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Abstract
Unemployment insurance is more valuable when self-insurance is more diﬃcult. Self-insurance
is more viable when the cost of borrowing and the cost of saving are low. The cost of savings
depends on the timing of income and the timing of needs, as well as private and market discount
rates. Heterogeneity in any of these factors translates into heterogeneity in the cost of saving
and thus in the value of unemployment insurance. We develop a life-cycle model to illustrate
these connections. We then provide empirical evidence on the extent of credit constraints and
heterogeneity in the cost of saving among job losers. Among job losers, 25% do not have access
to credit markets. Liquid assets that can be used to buﬀer employment shocks are lower for
households with children (high needs). Among older households, those with illiquid pension
wealth have less liquid wealth.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In most developed countries unemployment insurance is a large and important public program.
Theoretically, such compulsory social insurance may solve an adverse selection problem which limits
private unemployment insurance, but in common with private insurance, may induce moral hazard.
Empirical research has documented that public unemployment insurance has consumption smoothing
beneﬁts but does distort the behaviour of workers and ﬁrms.1
From the point of view of an individual worker, the value of unemployment insurance will depend
on how diﬃcult it is to self-insurance. This in turn will depend on the cost of borrowing (credit
market imperfections) and on the cost of (precautionary) saving. The cost of savings depends
on the timing of income and the timing of needs, as well as private and market discount rates.
Heterogeneity in any of these factors will translate into heterogeneity in the cost of saving. Market
imperfections mean heterogeneity in the cost of saving passes through to heterogeneity in the value
of unemployment insurance.
Recent studies of household wealth (Samwick, 1998) and consumption growth (Attanasio et al.,
1999; Alan and Browning, 2003) provide empirical evidence of important heterogeneity in some of
the determinants of the cost of saving. Our goal in this paper is to consider heterogeneity in access
to credit markets after job loss and in the cost of saving prior to job loss.
We ﬁrst construct a transparent (ﬁnite horizon) life-cycle consumption model, extending Bailey
(1978). In our model, job loss is exogenous, the unemployed can invest in subsequent earnings
capacity, insurance is partly from public unemployment insurance and partly from private savings,
and we allow for the possibility of credit constraints. We use this model to illustrate the connections
between credit market imperfections, the cost of saving and the eﬀects of unemployment insurance.
Using this model as a guide, we then investigate empirically credit market access and holdings
of liquid assets among job losers, using data from an unusual Canadian survey. The survey is of
individuals who lost their jobs in particular windows in time and contains among other information,
data on ﬁnancial circumstances at the time of job loss and after job loss. To assess the importance of
credit constraints, we have a unique combination of questions including subjective questions about
1On the distortions, see for example, Meyer (1990), Atkinson and Mickelwright, (1990), Anderson and Meyer
(1993). On the consumption smoothing, see Hamermesh (1982), Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001),
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), Sullivan (2002).
2whether individuals are able to borrow and want to borrow, as well as objective questions on their
success at obtaining credit since job loss. The latter are similar to those analyzed by Jappelli (1990)
in a general population sample. We also have unique information on liquid assets held exactly at
t h et i m eo fj o bl o s s .
A quarter of job losers report that they could not borrow to raise current consumption. The
incidence of credit constraints falls with age. With respect to liquid assets held at job loss we ﬁnd
striking heterogeneity. Almost half of job losers reported that their households had no such resources
at the time of job loss. A quarter reported that their household had liquid savings of more than three
months of usual household income. We further ﬁnd that much of this variation can be understood
in terms of life-cycle considerations. Liquid assets holdings are lower for households with children
present (high needs). Among older households, those with illiquid pension wealth hold less liquid
wealth with which they could smooth a temporary income loss.
In the next section we discuss our model. Section 3 outlines the implications of our model for
asset accumulation, as well as more general implications. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 presents our empirical analysis of credit constraints and ﬁnancial circumstances and Section 6
concludes.
2 Life-Cycle Model
We develop a life-cycle model of consumption to illustrate how the eﬀects of unemployment insur-
ance depend on the cost of saving and the cost of borrowing. Potentially important beneﬁts of
unemployment insurance follow from enhanced consumption smoothing, and such beneﬁts accrue
to agents who are risk and ﬂuctuation averse, and not otherwise fully insured.2 Such agents will
typically want to save and borrow. While models of intertemporal consumption and savings under
uncertainty are plentiful, such models typically treat the income process as exogenous. Such an as-
sumption ignores the potential moral hazard associated with unemployment insurance. On the other
hand, the most common framework for thinking about the moral hazard induced by unemployment
insurance is search models. In such models agents typically income maximize, and this is justiﬁed
by assuming either linear utility (risk neutrality) or perfect insurance. Thus such models preclude
2In standard additive models, risk and ﬂuctuation aversion are the same (the inverse of the intertemporal sub-
stitution elasticity). We note both here because below we will emphasize that unemployment insurance can smooth
consumption both over states and over time.
3the most obvious beneﬁts of unemployment insurance. Our aim therefore is to build a framework for
thinking about unemployment insurance which contrasts the moral hazard costs of unemployment
insurance with the consumption smoothing beneﬁts in the presence of credit market imperfections.
Bailey (1978) models the trade-oﬀ between consumption smoothing and moral hazard in a partial
equilibrium framework. In Bailey’s two period model, agents may lose their job between the ﬁrst and
second period. They then choose what portion of the second period to spend out of work. Crucially,
utility depends only on total income in the second period: the fact that income may be low while
unemployed is immaterial. This is consistent with the unemployed having complete access to credit
markets. However, it is inconsistent with the common perception that the unemployed may be in
temporarily diﬃcult ﬁnancial circumstances. Because of its transparency and useful insights, the
Bailey model is still used to assess empirical estimates of the costs and beneﬁts of unemployment
insurance (see for example Gruber, 1997). Nevertheless, the restriction that the timing of income
after job loss in unimportant is an important limitation. Our model might best be thought of as
an extension of the Bailey framework. It develops that framework in two ways: ﬁrst, we introduce
role for credit constraints; second, we introduce a retirement savings motive. The latter allows us
to vary the cost of holding assets for precautionary reasons. Our model is partial equilibrium but
with a government budget constraint, like the Bailey model.3
There are a number of alternatives to the ﬁnite horizon life-cycle model we develop. Hansen
and Imrohorglu (1992) model unemployment insurance in an inﬁnite horizon, calibrated dynamic
general equilibrium model. This is less suitable for our purposes of understanding the eﬀects of
heterogeneity in the cost of saving because with an inﬁnite horizon, agents must be impatient in
order to keep the problem bounded. In an inﬁnite horizon, partial equilibrium model, Lentz (2003)
varies the degree of impatience and illustrates that the value of unemployment insurance depends
on the “cost of saving”. The more impatient agents are, the more costly it is for them to hold
ab u ﬀer stock of savings, and the more valuable social insurance becomes. However, the inﬁnite
3We believe that for our purposes the general equilibrium feedback eﬀects of savings by the unemployed onto the
interest rate is unimportant: because wealth distributions are so highly skewed, it is reasonable to model users of
unemployment insurance systems as price takers in capital markets (even in aggegrate).
A second potential general equilibrium eﬀect is the eﬀect of unemployment insurance on the vacancy posting
behaviour of ﬁrms (ﬁrms’ vacancy decisions do not take into account the positive externality on other ﬁrms of creating
a “thicker” market). Similarly, we do not capture the negative externality of search on the probability of other people
ﬁnding jobs. These general equilibrium and externality eﬀects may be important but it is unlikely that there will be
an important interaction with the costs and beneﬁts we analyse in the current paper.
4horizon framework precludes Lentz from considering patient agents and from explicitly introducing
life-cycle considerations. Rendon (2003) carries out a similar exercise in a ﬁnite horizon, allowing
for some life-cycle eﬀects. His focus is on estimating structural parameters rather than on exploring
heterogeneity due to life-cycle eﬀects. Costain (1999) also works with a ﬁnite horizon model, but
allowing for general equilibrium eﬀects. His focus is on the value of unemployment insurance using
a model calibrated to median wealth holdings and so he explicitly ignores the heterogeneity in the
data. Further, like Rendon, he does not consider that heterogeneity in characteristics and in wealth
may make the value of unemployment insurance very diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals.4 It is the
eﬀects of this heterogeneity across households that we illustrate in our model and then explore in
our empirical analysis. In particular, we show the extent that the heterogeneity in asset holdings in
the data can be explained by life-cycle considerations.
2.1 Assumptions and notation
Life has three stages: youth, middle-age and old age. We use subscripts to denote the life-stage
and note that life-stages may be of diﬀerent lengths. Agents are risk-averse and maximize expected
utility. They begin the ﬁrst stage (which lasts from 0 until T1) with initial assets A0(= 0).I nt h i s
stage agents work for a wage, w1, and consume continuously. Individuals pay two (proportional)
taxes: a pension contribution (τr), and an unemployment insurance contribution (τu). If they choose
to consume less than their net income, they accumulate assets. As in Bailey (1978), at the end of
the ﬁrst stage individuals face an exogenous probability (π) of job displacement. Where necessary,
we use superscripts d(displaced) and n(not displaced) to denote states of the world.
In the second stage (from T1 to T2) agents consume (and save or possibly borrow). If they are not
displaced at the end of the ﬁrst period, they continue to earn the wage w1. If agents are displaced
at the end of the ﬁrst period, they can return to work immediately at some wage which is strictly
less than the wage in the job from which they were displaced (w2(I =0 )<w 1). Alternatively, they
may choose to invest for time I ≤ T2 −T1. During this investment period they receive a beneﬁt b. If
I<T 2 −T1 they return to work at T1 +I , earning a wage w2(I) which is increasing in the duration
4Some recent papers focus on how the value of unemployment insurance depends on the nature of risk individuals
actually face. For example, Rogerson and Schindler (2002) show in a life-cycle model that the welfare beneﬁto f
unemployment insurance depends on the persistence of earnings losses on unemployment. Low et al. (2004) distinguish
employment risk from earnings risk and show that the lack of persistence in unemployment shocks means self-insurance
is more feasible and public unemployment insurance less valuable.
5of investment (w2(0) ≤ w2(I) ≤ w1). Individuals pay taxes on unemployment beneﬁts.
We can interpret investment in a number of alternative ways: ﬁrst, investment may be search by
the unemployed with longer search leading to a better match;5 second, investment may be retrain-
ing by the unemployed with wages being higher the longer the training period; third, investment
may merely be waiting for recall; ﬁnally, if we reinterpret unemployment beneﬁta sam i n i m u m
payment to the worker, investment may be thought of as on-the-job training where workers receive
a minimum payment during the training period, but a higher wage on completion. The presence of
unemployment beneﬁt may distort these investment decisions.
In the ﬁnal stage of life (from T2 to T3), individuals are (exogenously) retired and collect a
pension, which they consume. The size of their pension is determined solely by their contributions
in the ﬁrst two stages of life and contains no redistributive element. In retirement individuals pay no
t a x e s .A tt h ee n do ft h et h i r ds t a g et h e yd i ew i t ht e r m i n a la s s e t sA3 =0 . The amount of resources
available for consumption in retirement is determined by pension wealth plus liquid asset holdings
not consumed in earlier stages.
In a general intertemporal consumption model, an agent’s patience (their inclination to save)
will be determined by the interest rate, their discount factor, the time path of their needs, and the
time path of their income. We assume that there is no discounting or rate of return (δ = r =0 ).
We also abstract from explicitly modelling changes in needs. This gives us ﬂat desired consumption
paths. However, we can vary the impatience (again, deﬁned as the inclination to save) of the agents
in this model by varying the growth rate of income they face.
Savings motives are not additive: liquid assets held for precautionary reasons (smoothing con-
sumption in the face of a temporary income loss) can be consumed in retirement if the negative
shock is not realised. Equally, liquid assets held for retirement purposes may be partially used for
precautionary reasons if unexpected shocks occur. This point is also emphasized by Dynan, Skinner
and Zeldes (2002) who argue that precautionary savings and savings for a bequest motive cannot be
distinguished. It is more costly for an impatient agent to accumulate precautionary balances as the
marginal utility of current consumption is high (and similarly, resources that become available late
in life - if the shock is not realized - have low value).
5It is possible that wages decline if unemployment is too long. In the current model, there is no uncertainty about
job oﬀer arrival, and so if there were no unemployment beneﬁt ,w ew o u l db ea b l et oi g n o r et h ep a r to ft h ei n v e s t m e n t
schedule which is declining.
6In our model we alter the growth rate of income through (exogenous) changes to the pension
system. With high withholding (large τr) agents face a rising income proﬁle. Such agents would like
to borrow, and saving is costly for such agents. With low withholding, agents face a falling income
proﬁle and wish to save. This is crucial because it will allow us to explore the value of unemployment
insurance to agents for whom it is more or less costly to save.
Timing in the model is summarized in Figure 1 and notation in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation and Earnings
ct : consumption at time t τr : social security tax
As : assets at end of stage s τu : unemployment insurance tax
ws : wage in stage s b : unemployment beneﬁt
Ys : gross income for stage s (replacement ratio)
Es : gross earnings for stage s I : duration of investment
Gross Earnings Gross Income
(earnings + beneﬁts)
Stage 1 E1 = w1T1 Y1 = E1
Stage 2 Ed
2 =( T2 − T1 − I)w2(I) Y d
2 = E2 + bY1I
(displaced)
Stage 2 En




Stage 3 E3 =0 .0 Y i
3 = τr(Y1 + Y i
2)
All income in stages 1 and 2 is subject to tax at a rate tr + tu.
There are theoretical reasons to think that access to credit and the cost of borrowing may be
limited and may vary across individuals.6 We consider an extreme variation in the cost of borrowing,
comparing cases where agents can borrow freely (subject only to the terminal asset condition) with
cases where they face an exogenous borrowing limit At ≥− φ. We provide direct empirical evidence
o nt h ee x t e n to fc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t samong job losers in section 5.1.
6In asymetric information models, it may be better for lenders to better to ration credit than to raise interest rates
because high interest rates may bring only high risk borrowers (Jaﬀee and Russel, 1976; Stiglitze and Weiss, 1981);
In endogenous credit constraint models, lenders will lend only up to the point that default (and subsequent autarky)
becomes attactive (Kehoe and Levinc, 1993; Kocherlakota,1996)
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Figure 1: Time Path of Earnings
2.2 Individual Optimization Problem
We now lay out the individual optimization problem, taking b, τr,a n dτu as given. The individual
maximises




u(ct)dt + πV d
2 (A1)+( 1− π)V n
2 (A1) (1)
subject to the budget constraint
Z T1
0
ctdt = −A1 + Y1 (1 − τr − τu)
and, if present, the credit constraint,
A1 ≥− φ.
The solution to this problem can be characterised by the Euler equation:
∂V1
∂A1








+ µ1 =0 (2)
µ1 ≥ 0,A 1 ≥− φ. (3)
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n ta ﬀects equation (2) in two possible ways: ﬁrst, it may cause
the Euler equation to be violated (ie. µ1 is strictly positive); second, the constraint may bind in






∂A1 , even though µ1 =0 .7
7If there is no displacement, the constraint will only bind in period 2 if individuals are suﬃciently impatient (if τr
is suﬃciently high).
8In the absence of credit constraints, the solution is simple because the consumption path post-
displacement can be separated from the timing of income: individuals displaced in the second stage
choose investment simply to maximise income and, since there is no discounting, individuals choose
consumption to be constant in any particular state. Once we know consumption post-displacement,







∂A1 in equation (2) by the marginal utility of consumption in each
state.
The presence of credit constraints introduces an interaction between the investment decision and
the consumption decision and so the choice of investment depends on the consumption level in the
investment period. This means investment will depend on asset holdings, A1. To solve the problem
with the credit constraint, we have to solve simultaneously the asset allocation equation (2) and the
optimal investment equation (19). In the remainder of this section, we solve for the optimal choices
of consumption and investment at each stage.
Stage 3: In the third (retirement) stage of life, the value function is








ctdt = A2 + τr(Y1 + Y2 (I)) (4)
where I = −1 indicates the individual was not displaced in period 2. Note that the borrowing
constraint, if present, is irrelevant because the constraint that terminal assets are zero and the
assumption that δ =0mean consumption is spread evenly through the stage. Associating λ3 with












These expressions are needed in solving for assets and investment in early stages.
9Stage 2 (not displaced): In the second stage there are two cases: displaced (d)o rn o t( n). If
the agent is not displaced, her value function is
V n








ctdt = A1 − A2 + Y n
2 (1 − τr − τu) (5)
As with stage 3, consumption will be constant within the stage. Associating the multiplier λ2n with







+ µ2n =0 (6)
µ2n ≥ 0,A 2n ≥− φ.
If there is no borrowing constraint, or the constraint is not binding, µ2n =0and consumption will
be smooth between stages 2 and 3.
Stage 2 (displaced): No credit constraint We consider optimal choices after displacement ﬁrst
for the case with no credit constraint and in the next subsection for the case with credit constraints.
If the worker is displaced her value function is
V d













(1 − τr − τu) (7)
0 ≤ I ≤ T2 − T1 (8)
As before, consumption will be constant within the stage. Associating the multiplier λ2d with







− λ2d =0 (9)
S i n c ew ek n o wc o n s u m p t i o ni nt h eﬁnal period, we can solve directly for consumption in period 2
and for λ2d.
10Turning to investment behaviour, the absence of a credit constraint means that the choice over
I can be considered independently from the choice of A2.. T h ec h o i c eo fI will be the income
maximising choice that solves8
max
I
[w2 (I)(T2 − T1 − I)+bY1I](1− τu),
which yields the ﬁrst order condition
w0
2 (I)(T2 − T1 − I)+bY1 = w2 (I) (10)
The left hand side of equation (10) is the marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t m e n ta n dt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei st h e
marginal cost of investment, analogous to the partial equilibrium, linear utility model (Mortensen,
1986). The marginal beneﬁt of investment includes unemployment beneﬁt and the resulting increase
in the future wage. The marginal cost is the (forgone) wage. The marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t m e n ti s
increased by the unemployment beneﬁt paid and so a positive replacement rate induces ineﬃcient
(over) investment. This is the moral hazard which is typically cited as the “cost” of unemployment
insurance and which is the subject of the large empirical literature discussed in the introduction.
Stage 2 (displaced): With credit constraint
The presence of the credit constraint means the timing of income within the second stage may
matter. The length of investment and the path of consumption will be jointly determined rather
than being separable decisions as in the absence of credit constraints. Therefore, it is useful to divide
the stage into an earnings and an investment substage.
Earnings sub-stage
V d








ctdt = A1 − A2 + Ed
2(I)(1− τr − τu) (11)
A2 ≥− φ (12)
8Noting that the pension tax paid in stage 2 is returned in stage 3.








− λ2E + µ2E =0 (13)
µ2E ≥ 0,A 2 ≥− φ






























ctIdt = A1 − A1+I + bY1I (1 − τr − τu) (16)
A1+I ≥− φ (17)
Associating the multiplier λ2I with the ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n ta n dµ2I with the second constraint, gives








− λ2I + µ2I +0 (18)
µ2I ≥ 0,A 1+I ≥− φ
Turning to investment behaviour, the size of the distortion induced by unemployment beneﬁti s
aﬀected by the presence of credit constraints. The presence of this interaction between unemployment
beneﬁt and credit constraints is an important implication of our model.
In this case, we need to use the ﬁrst-order condition from maximising equation (15) with respect
to I.
9As before, consumption must be constant within each sub-stage because no new information arrives within each
sub-stage and the interest rate equals the discount rate. This in turn means that if the constraint binds at all in a








+ u(c2I)+λ2IbY1 (1 − τr − τu) − λ2Ic2I




[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)]+bY1 [λ2I (1 − τr − τu)+λ3τr]=u(c2E)−u(c2I)+λ2Ic2I−λ2Ec2E.
Using the deﬁnition of Ed
2, this can be rearranged as:
w0 (I)(T2 − T1 − I)[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)] + bY1 [λ2I (1 − τr − τu)+λ3τr]
= w(I)[λ3τr + λ2E (1 − τr − τu)] + Ψ (19)
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne Ψ by
Ψ =[ u(c2E) − u(c2I)] − [λ2Ec2E − λ2Ic2I].
The left hand side of equation (19) is the marginal beneﬁt of investment and the right hand side
is the marginal cost of investment, analogous to condition (10). The marginal beneﬁt of investment
includes unemployment beneﬁt and the resulting increase in the future wage. Here (and in contrast
to condition 10) both are weighted by marginal utility terms which are share weighted averages
of the marginal utilities in the stages in which the relevant resources will be realized. The ﬁrst
term in the marginal cost is the (forgone) wage, again valued at a share weighted average of the
marginal utilities in the periods in which it is received (note that because of the mandatory pension
contributions, a fraction of current earnings is received in retirement). The second term Ψ (which
would not appear if utility were linear) is a utility cost term associated with the failure to smooth
consumption between the investment and earnings substages of period 2 and which depends on risk
aversion.10 This term can be approximated as11
Ψ ≈ γ∆c2Eu0 (c2E),
10If the credit constraint is not binding, utility and marginal utility are equalised across periods and so Ψ =0 .
11Taking a ﬁrst-order approximation to u(c2E) around c2I and substituting gives
φ = u0 (c2I)c2E − λ2Ec2E
=
¡
u0 (c2I) − u0 (c2E)
¢
c2E
Taking an approximation for u0 (c2E) around c2I








(c2E − c2I)u0 (c2E)
13where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion which captures the degree of aversion to ﬂuctuations
in consumption. The presence of Ψ increases the marginal cost of investment because consumption
is no longer smoothed over substages in a way that would not occur if there are no credit constraints.
The size of this cost is increasing in the degree of ﬂuctuation aversion. This reduces investment below
investment when unconstrained. Investment when constrained may potentially fall below the level
which would maximise earned income. In this case, increasing unemployment beneﬁts can induce a
more eﬃcient level of search.
2.3 Government Budget Constraints
Unemployment beneﬁti sﬁnanced in our model by the tax τu and we set τu to balance the gov-
ernment budget constraint. Ignoring the government budget constraint would mean increases in
unemployment duration associated with more generous beneﬁts do not introduce extra costs.
The budget constraint for the unemployment insurance system is:
τu (w1T1 + πw2(I∗)((T2 − T1) − I∗)+( 1− π)w2(T2 − T1)) = πI∗bY (1 − τu) (20)
This implies that the budget is set to balance across individuals and there is redistribution from
workers to the unemployed. Because there is no aggregate risk, we can alternatively say that the
budget balances in expectation and so insurance is actuarially fair.
A sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n2 . 1 ,b u d g e tb a l a n c ei nt h e pension system is imposed by each individual
receiving the sum of their earlier contributions as retirement income: Y3 = τr(Y1 + Y2 (I)). This
implies that the pension system is forced saving, and contains no element of redistribution between
individuals and no notion of insurance.
If there were only one government budget constraint, pension provision could contain an element
of redistribution by providing “pension credits” for periods in unemployment. Similarly we do not
consider redistribution across individuals who face diﬀerent job loss risk, π,o rd i ﬀerent loss of
potential earnings. Our focus is the on the non-redistributive aspects of unemployment insurance.
3 Implications of the Model
In this section, we outline implications of our model for individual saving behaviour. It is these
implications which are the focus of our empirical evidence in subsequent sections. We also con-
14sider implications for consumption smoothing, investment and the marginal value of unemployment
insurance. Implications of the model are demonstrated partly analytically and partly numerically.






and a simple investment function, w(I)=Iη.In our baseline we set γ =1 .5 and η =0 .5. Each stage
is assumed to be of length 1 and the wage rate in stage 1 is normalised to 1. We explore variation
in replacement rates, variation in risk of layoﬀ and timing of layoﬀ and variation in the patience of
agents. As noted above, the latter is controlled by the pension tax (τr) which controls the growth
rate of expected income. With low τr agents anticipate low income in the future and save; with high
τr agents anticipate high income in the future and would like to borrow. We interpret the variation
in τr as variation in the cost of saving for precautionary reasons.
3.1 Precautionary Savings
Figure 2 displays the time paths of assets and consumption for simulations of our model with diﬀerent
parameter values. The left hand side panel present time paths for agents who can borrow; the right
hand side panels present time paths for agents who cannot borrow. Moving from top to bottom
the panels are diﬀerentiated by a decreasing cost of saving. In the top panels a very high value for
pension withholdings is chosen which has the eﬀect of making additional savings costly and agents
very impatient (they would like to bring resources forward from the future.) In the bottom panels
pension contributions are very low, the income proﬁle is downward sloping, agents have a strong life-
cyle (retirement) savings motive, and hence are patient. The middle panels present an intermediate
case.
When agents are able to borrow, consumption is equalized across time (after the shock is re-
alised) and the consumption path is independent of the timing of income. However, because time
diversiﬁcation is limited by the ﬁniteness of life, consumption is not completely equalized across
states. Patient agents (row iii in Figure 2) smooth by saving and their holdings of liquid assets
increase with age until retirement, while impatient agents (row i) smooth by borrowing and their
borrowing increases with age until retirement. This implies that as the cost of saving increases,
individuals save less, and then borrow if the cost of saving becomes high enough.
15Figure 2: Asset and Consumption Paths
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16The right hand column of Figure 2 shows that a similar results holds when individuals are unable
to borrow: as the cost of saving increases, individuals save less, and then want to borrow if the cost of
saving becomes high enough. Because patient agents have suﬃcient liquid wealth to smooth without
borrowing, their time paths of consumption are unaﬀected by their inability to borrow (row iii). By
contrast, impatient agents who cannot borrow cannot fully smooth consumption across time after
job loss and consumption rises at reemployment (rows i and ii).
Figure 3 shows the extent of asset accumulation (A1)f o rd i ﬀerent replacement rates and for
diﬀerent costs of saving and borrowing. As with Figure 2, each row represents a diﬀerent cost of
saving, and in each graph we show the case where borrowing is unconstrained and the case where
borrowing is constrained. The two columns represent diﬀerent values of the probability of job loss.
Figure 3 reinforces that the extent of liquid asset holdings and the ability to self-insure depends
on the cost of saving: greater forced retirement saving or greater impatience lead to lower liquid asset
holdings. This result holds whether or not individuals are able to borrow. However, Figure 3 shows
that the inability to borrow leads to greater asset holdings relative to the case where individuals are
able to borrow. Further, row (ii) in Figure 3 shows that borrowing constraints can lead to greater
asset holdings even if asset holdings are positive in the unconstrained case.
Asset accumulation in this model is for partly for precautionary reasons and partly to fund
consumption in retirement. Assets not needed for precautionary reasons can instead be consumed
in retirement. In this context, an increase in unemployment insurance will crowd out liquid asset
holdings,12 but the extent of the crowd-out will depend on the substitutability between asset motives:
crowd-out is greater when liquid assets are not used for consumption in retirement (row i in Figure
3).
Comparing the two columns of Figure 2, a greater expectation of job loss leads to higher liquid
asset holdings (or less borrowing). This holds whether or not individuals are able to borrow. This
diﬀerence in expectation of job loss reﬂects heterogeneity in the income processes that individuals
face. This heterogeneity will translate into diﬀerent levels of holdings of liquid assets even if all
individuals have the same cost of saving. A greater expectation of job loss also aﬀects the extent
of crowding out: a greater probability of job loss implies greater crowding out because more of the
12Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate the extent unemployment insurance crowds out precautionary saving.
17holdings of liquid assets are for precautionary rather than retirement reasons.
Figure 3: Asset Accumulation by Replacement Ratio
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In our framework, there is only one point in time where job loss may occur and in particular
we assume there is no uninsured uncertainty after this point. We make this simpliﬁcation to make
clear the distinction between the eﬀect of unemployment insurance in smoothing over states versus
smoothing over time. In the presence of ongoing uncertainty, however, the distinction is less clear:
uncertainty about future income increases the cost of borrowing because borrowing reduces the
amount of non-committed income in future states. This makes borrowing constraints and ongoing
uncertainty act in the same way to limit borrowing in the stage after the initial job loss (this analogy
between borrowing constraints and uncertainty was ﬁrst stressed by Deaton, 1991).
3.2 Further Implications
In the empirical sections 4 and 5 we focus on relating the implications for saving behaviour to the
data. Our aim in this subsection, however, is to show the implications that the costs of saving and
18the inability to borrow have for consumption smoothing, investment and the marginal beneﬁto f
unemployment insurance.
Consumption Smoothing From the ﬁrst-order conditions (2), (6) and (9) in Section 2.2, it is
straightforward to see that in the absence of credit constraints, or if the constraints do not bind:
λ2I = λ2E = λ2d = λ3d
λ2n = λ3n
λ1 = πλ2d +( 1− π)λ2n
but
λ2n = λ3n 6= λ2d = λ3d
Marginal utility is smoothed over time (at least in expectation) but not over states. The ﬁniteness
of life means that households cannot perfectly self-insure even in the absence of credit constraints.
Unemployment insurance has what we term an ‘insurance beneﬁt’, in that it helps to smooth marginal
utility across states. Unemployment insurance reduces λ2d− λ2n which is the ‘permanent shock’ of
job loss (See also Browning and Crossley, 2001). This is the beneﬁt of unemployment insurance
that operates in the Bailey model, and is similar to the beneﬁt of progressive taxation which was
discussed by Varian (1980): agents are taxed in good states (when income is high) and receive a
beneﬁtw h e ni n c o m ei sl o w .
If credit constraints bind, then for equations (2), (6), (13) and (18):
λ2I = λ2E + µ2I = λ3d + µ2I + µ2E
λ2n = λ3n + µ2n
λ1 = πλ2I +( 1− π)λ2n + µ1
Marginal utility is smoothed neither over states (λ2d 6= λ2n) n o ro v e rt i m ea f t e rj o bl o s s(λ2I 6= λ2E).
Credit constraints limit the time diversiﬁcation of risk (Gollier, 2001). By reducing λ2I − λ2E = µI
(or λ2E−λ3 = µE) unemployment insurance can have another beneﬁt (beyond the insurance beneﬁt
noted above): it helps to smooth consumption over time.
This consumption smoothing beneﬁt of unemployment insurance is absent in the Bailey (1978)
model because post-displacement, consumption is independent of labour market state. Thus cal-
19culations of optimal beneﬁts that are based on this model (as in Gruber, 1997) implicitly assume
that there are no credit constraints and that agents can fully time diversify employment risk. Full
time-diversiﬁcation of employment shocks across a ﬁnite life is nonetheless incomplete insurance,
and so unemployment insurance raises welfare by pooling risk across individuals.
Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) both estimate regression equations of the form:
∆lnct = Xβ + αb + e
where legislative variation (across time, or time and jurisdictions) is used to estimate α.G r u b e r
interprets his estimate of α as an estimate of the insurance beneﬁts of unemployment insurance
(and uses that estimate in optimal beneﬁt calculations based on the Bailey model). In contrast,
Browning and Crossley set out an explicit (Euler equation) framework in which α captures the
eﬀect on consumption growth of a binding credit constraint. In terms of the model presented here,
Gruber interprets α as λ2d− λ2n, while Browning and Crossley interpret α = λ2I − λ2E = µI. If
the data were generated by the model developed in the paper, both eﬀects would be captured by
a regression like that described above. This can be seen clearly in Figure 4, in which simulations
of the model are used to generate plots of ∆lnct against b for agents that diﬀer by patience, risk
aversion and access to credit markets. In all cases, consumption loss decreases as beneﬁts increase,
but among the impatient (row i) and intermediate agents (row ii) the relationship is steeper when
borrowing is restricted. In other words, an increase in unemployment insurance leads to a larger
reduction in consumption loss when saving and hence self-insurance is more costly. Self-insurance
is also harder against job loss early in life and Figure 4 shows that consumption loss is therefore
greater for job losses earlier in life.
Figure 4 illustrates that the eﬀect is of b on ∆lnCt is heterogeneous across agents. Heterogene-
ity in consumption loss arises between individuals with diﬀerent access to credit markets or with
diﬀerences in the timing of job loss. Heterogeneity in the cost of saving (degree of impatience) only
translates into heterogeneity in consumption loss for individuals with restricted borrowing. Brown-
ing and Crossley (2001) capture some of the heterogeneity in consumption loss. As just noted, and
as predicted by the model developed here, they ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects among households with and
without liquid assets. Second, using quantile regressions they document considerable heterogeneity
20Figure 4: Consumption Loss by Replacement Rate
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in α even among agents with no liquid assets at job loss.13 This evidence of heterogeneity can be
used as evidence of borrowing constraints.
Investment Equation (19) in section 2.2 shows how the return to investment depends on the
presence of borrowing constraints. This is illustrated by the simulations presented in Figure 5. Each
panel plots the duration of investment against the replacement rates. The six panels each present
ad i ﬀerent parameterization of the model. They diﬀer by the assumed patience of the agent and
by the timing of job loss. In each panel, the solid line represents the case where the agent is credit
constrained,14 and the line comprised of long dashes represents the case where the agent can borrow
freely. The optimal level of investment is indicated in each panel by the horizontal line of short
dashes. Among the impatient agents and agents of intermediate patience, credit constraints lead to
under-investment, and eﬃcient search durations are induced by positive replacement rates. This is
particularly the case when job loss happens earlier in life. As we saw in the preceding analysis of
13Of course, the apparent heterogeneity in α may, in part, be picking up the nonlinearity in the relationship that
we observe in Figure 4 and which is not considered in the empirical literature.
14We use credit constrained and liquidity constrained interchangably.
21consumption smoothing, the very patient agents are unaﬀected by credit constraints (because they
have considerable liquid savings). As with consumption, heterogeneity in impatience only matters
for search behaviour if individuals are credit constrained.
Figure 5: Length of Investment by Replacement Rate
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Marginal Beneﬁt of Unemployment Insurance We have shown that the cost of saving and the
ability to borrow matter for understanding how individuals behaviour in response to unemployment
insurance. This raises the issue of how the marginal beneﬁt of unemployment insurance depends on
the cost of saving and the ability to borrow.
The marginal beneﬁt of unemployment insurance derives from providing smoothing over states
and smoothing over time. The marginal cost of unemployment insurance is the higher taxes that
must be paid. We can calculate ∂V1
∂b from equation (1), using the government budget constraint (20)
22to substitute in the eﬀect on the tax rate:15
∂V1
∂b












2 +( 1− π)Y2n
#
The ﬁrst term in the square brackets is the marginal beneﬁt of the unemployment insurance, the
second term is the implied increase in the tax rate which imposes a cost. We are particularly
interested in how the net beneﬁt varies with τr and with the imposition of the borrowing constraint.
Since I∗ changes with these factors, we plot the values for ∂V1
∂b in Figure 6.
If individuals are unconstrained, then the value of unemployment insurance stems only from
smoothing over states. Increases in impatience do not aﬀect the value of unemployment insurance
because individuals are able to reallocate resources across their lifetime to satisfy their impatience.
This implies that the marginal beneﬁt of unemployment insurance will be independent of the cost
of saving. Figure 6 conﬁrms that the cost of saving (τr)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the marginal value of
unemployment insurance. The marginal value of unemployment insurance is higher for younger job
losers because they have had less time to save and self-insure.
When there are credit constraints, marginal beneﬁta tb =0is highest for the most impatient
agents: extra income in the investment phase has a high marginal utility (λ2d). As beneﬁts increase
the marginal beneﬁt of unemployment insurance declines, with the rate of decline being greater the
greater the impatience. This faster decline is due to changes in the marginal beneﬁto fs m o o t h i n g
over time: if agents are more impatient then the cost of having to pay taxes early in life is greater.
This means that the marginal beneﬁt of unemployment insurance is not necessarily higher when
credit constrained despite the additional value of smoothing over time.16 The key point to stress
from Figure 6 is the heterogeneity in the marginal beneﬁto fs a v i n g .
The analysis just presented has illustrated that the value of unemployment insurance depends on
the cost of saving - a point also emphasized by Lentz (2003). In our model, unemployment insurance
has more value for agents who have made substantial pension contribution, and hence do not wish
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16This implies that the optimal replacement ratio may be higher or lower in the presence of credit constraints.
23Figure 6: Marginal Beneﬁto fU n e m p l o y m e n tI n s u r a n c e
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A ﬁnal implication in considering the value of unemployment insurance is that for some para-
meterisations (for example with τr =0 .3)c r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t sc a nraise welfare. The reason for this
surprising result is that the displaced agent does not internalize the negative externality that her
search behaviour has through the government budget constraint. That is, in this model, the absence
of credit markets leave the government less constrained by moral hazard, and able to oﬀer more
insurance. Another way to think about this is that in a second best world, the ability to control
borrowing would give the government a second instrument.17 This result is analogous to Diamond
and Mirrlees (1979).
4 Data, Sample and Institutional Setting
4.1 The 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel
(COEP). The Canadian Out of Employment Panels are a series of surveys commissioned by Human
Resources Development Canada for the purposes of evaluating a number of legislative changes to
the Canadian unemployment insurance system that occurred during the 1990s. In Canada, the end
of a job is marked by the employer submitting a Record of Employment (ROE) to the government.
The ﬂows of such forms within certain time windows formed the sampling frames for these surveys.
17Note that if we think of a population of ex ante homogeneous agents, the expected utility criteria amounts to a
Utilitarian social welfare funtion. We could overturn this result (for the same parameter values) with a non-Utilitarian
social welfare function which placed more weight on the less fortunate (job losers).
24Data from the 1995 survey is publicly available18, and contain the detailed questions on the
ability and desire to borrow which are central to the empirical work reported in this paper. The
respondents in the 1995 survey lost their jobs in the ﬁrst half of 1995, and were interviewed twice,
in the 3rd and ﬁfth quarters after job loss. Thus the respondents were ﬁrst interviewed in the last
quarter of 1995 and ﬁrst quarter of 1996. Information was collected pertaining to their circumstances
at the interview date and retrospectively about their circumstances prior to the end of the relevant
job, and over the intervening period. Information was collected about work, training, and job search,
about household composition, consumption, income and ﬁnances, and about beneﬁt receipt.
4.2 Sample
There were 7818 respondents to the 1995 COEP. The COEP samples job separations of various types,
including quits, dismissals, separations due to illness, and temporary and permanent layoﬀs. In the
selection of a sample for analysis, we discarded 18 respondents who did not report a separation reason.
We also discarded 464 individuals who, although they lost a job, reported continuing employment
in a second job. Next, we deleted from the sample 665 respondents who reported that they quit to
take another job. These individuals have little or no unemployment and are outside the scope of our
interest. Finally we deleted 1091 individuals age 25 or younger and 474 individuals over age 55, to
focus on prime age workers.
Of the remaining 5015 observations, we focussed on those 2922 who lived in a nuclear family
(alone, with a spouse, or spouse and children) and were the primary earner in their households. The
job loss of primary earners is of particular interest. Moreover, previous experience with this data
suggests the quality of the survey responses on household ﬁnances is lower among respondents in
other family types (for example, living with their parents or with unrelated adults). Of these 2922
respondents, 1659 were employed at the time of the ﬁrst interview (in the third quarter after job
loss). The other 1263 were not working at the time of interview, though some of these had spells
of employment between the initial job loss and the interview. The multivariate analyses reported in
the paper are based on slightly smaller samples, due to the inevitable item non-response in a large
and comprehensive survey.
18The survey was conducted by the Special Surveys Division of Statistics Canada, and further details are available
at:
http://www.statcan.ca/english/IPS/Data/72M0001XCB.htm.
254.3 The income shock of job loss
One way to think about the environment from which our respondents are drawn is to consider the
income shock associated with job loss. We have information on the change in monthly, take-home
household income between the month just prior to the job separation and the month prior to the
interview (in the third quarter after job loss). The mean percentage change for respondents out
of work at the interview is - 22% (median -20%). A quarter of out-of-work respondents report
income losses in excess of 39%. The modest size of the average income shock associated with non-
employment (a complete loss of earnings) reﬂects several factors. The unemployment insurance
system in Canada is fairly generous, with statutory replacement rates over 50% and beneﬁts lasting
up to a year. Moreover, because the Canadian income tax system is progressive, the actual (after-
tax) replacement rate is often higher than the statutory rate. Against that, insurable earnings are
capped, and workers losing jobs with earnings above the maximum insurable earnings will have an
eﬀective replacement rate below the statutory rate. Both eligibility for beneﬁts and the duration
of beneﬁts depend on the extent of recent employment. However, Canada also has a second tier of
income support: a means-tested social assistance program that would be available to those who are
ineligible for beneﬁts, or whose beneﬁts expire. Finally, while we focus on the primary earners, these
workers live in households, and many of those households have other earners. Quite mechanically,
if a worker provides 50% of household income prior to job loss, and faces a 60% actual replacement
rate, then the job loss represents a shock to personal income of — 40% but to household income it is
a shock of -20%.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Are Job Losers Credit Constrained?
T h em o d e lw ed e v e l o p e di nt h eﬁrst half of this paper illustrates that the eﬀect and value of un-
employment insurance will depend on whether job losers can access credit markets. If job losers
are credit constrained they will be limited in their ability to time diversify risk, and unemployment
insurance can have a consumption smoothing beneﬁt. Moreover, in the absence of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts, credit-constrained job losers may under-invest in search; beneﬁts can induce a
more eﬃcient level of investment. Finally, we can demonstrate cases in which credit market fail-
26ures can actually raise welfare (by mediating moral hazard and hence making it possible to for the
government to oﬀer more insurance.)
There is a substantial literature which attempts to establish the incidence of credit constraints
in general populations.19 It is reasonable to think that recent job losers may be more likely to be
credit-constrained than the general population. Casual empiricism suggests that employment status
is a key criteria considered by lenders. Moreover, investments in future earnings (either human
capital or job match) are not collateralisable.
Two kinds of studies have shed some light on the incidence and importance of credit constraints
among the unemployed. First are studies that (in the spirit of Zeldes’ early work on the full popula-
tion) compare the behaviour of agents who had diﬀerent levels of liquid assets at job loss (those that
without liquid assets being more likely to be constrained). The Browning and Crossley (2001) study,
described in Section 3.2, examines consumption growth. Sullivan (2002) performs a similar exercise
for food consumption growth using the PSID. Eﬀectively, these papers are looking for the excess
consumption growth associated Euler equation violations. Browning and Crossley (2003) focus on
durable replacement and Chapman, Crossley and Kim (2003) investigate training and retraining
choices. All of these papers document signiﬁcant diﬀerences between household with and without
liquid assets. A second group of studies documents the assets holdings of job losers and their bor-
rowing and dis-saving behaviour. These papers include Gruber (2001), Sullivan (2002) and Bloemen
and Stancanelli (2001).
All such studies have two important limitations. First, asset levels are not allocated randomly.
In the model presented in this paper it is the patient agents who hold assets at job loss, and the
behaviour of such agents can diﬀer in some ways from that of impatient agents even if there are no
restrictions on borrowing. Second, credit constraints can aﬀect behaviour and welfare even if they
never actually bind. In our model this is apparent in behaviour in the ﬁrst stage: for our baseline
level of impatience, savings and consumption behaviour in the ﬁrst stage is aﬀected by the ability
to borrow even though the constraint does not bind. This impact on behaviour occurs because of
the possibility of the constraint binding in the next stage. More generally, the possibility of a
19This literature includes (i) early ”excess sensitivity” (Euler equation) studies, including Zeldes (1989) who exam-
ined consumption growth in samples divided by liquid asset levels; (ii) studies that use direct survey questions about
the credit applications and borrowing, such as Jappelli (1990); and (iii) most recently, Gross and Souleles’ (2003)
work on credit card behaviour.
27borrowing constraint binding in the future can aﬀect behaviour in an earlier period (as ﬁrst shown
by Deaton, 1991). Thus, if agents are forward looking, studies that test for Euler equation violations
(observations of the constraint actually binding) will not capture the full extent and impact of limited
access to credit.
In this paper, we take a diﬀerent, complimentary, and more direct approach. We report the
responses of recent job losers to direct survey questions about their option to borrow and the desire
to borrow. In particular, the 1995 Canadian Out of Panel asked recent job losers two sets of questions
about their ability to borrow. They were asked subjective questions as follows:
• If you needed it, COULD you borrow money from a friend, family, or a ﬁnancial institution
in order to increase your household expenditures?
If the answer to this question was negative, the respondent was then asked:
• Suppose you COULD borrow money from one of these sources at 11% interest per year, to be
paid back starting in one year. WOULD you borrow money to increase your weekly spending
on household expenses?
A question similar to the ﬁrst of these was previously posed to low income households in Chicago,
as reported by Mayer and Jencks (1989). We take the answers to the ﬁrst question as informative
about access to credit. If a respondent says ”no” to the ﬁrst question and ”yes” to the second, we
take them to be reporting that they are constrained (in the sense that their Euler equation does not
hold with equality.)
Second, respondents were asked a series of questions about credit applications and the outcomes
of those applications, similar to the (U.S.) Survey of Consumer Finance questions studied by Jappelli
(1990). These questions were as follows:
• At any time since your job ended on [date of job loss] did you or any member of your household
apply for a loan at a bank or ﬁnancial institution, or for credit with any credit company?
(Applied)
• Were any of your requests for credit or a loan turned down? (Declined)
28• Were you, or any member of your household, given as much credit as you applied for? (Not
Full Amount)
• Were you later able to obtain the full amount you requested by reapplying to the same institution
or by applying elsewhere? (Got Later)
• Was there any time since [date of job loss] that you or any member of your household thought
of applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because you thought you
might be turned down? (Discouraged)
Respondents who reported applying for credit were also asked what type of credit they applied
for.
Responses to the ”subjective” questions are summarized in Table 2. Among respondents not
working at the time of interview, more than 30 percent report that they could not borrow. The
corresponding number for those back in employment is almost 10 percentage points lower. Overall,
about a quarter of recent job losers report no access to credit. Of those who report that they are
unable to borrow, only a fraction (13 percent among those not working) report that they would
borrow if they could. Thus, only a small fraction of the sample report being “constrained” in
the sense of an Euler equation violation. However, uncertainty about future employment and the
possibility that credit constraints may bind in the future may be dampening the desire to borrow.
Table 3 summarizes our sample’s responses to the ”Jappelli” questions. About a quarter of recent
job losers applied for some kind of credit before the 1st interview (6 to 9 months later). Of those,
about a quarter were constrained in the sense that their application was declined or they did not
get the full amount, and were not later able to get the full amount. Thus about 6 percent of the full
sample are constrained by this deﬁnition. Following Jappelli, we also consider a broader deﬁnition
of constrained that includes those who did not apply because they anticipated that an application
would not be successful (the discouraged). These are about 8 percent of the sample, so that about
14 percent of the sample are constrained by this broader deﬁnition.
Table 4 reports the type of credit our respondents applied for. Personal loans, car loans and
credit cards were the most common. Although the respondents could list up to 3 diﬀerent kinds of
credit, more than 90% listed only one type. Thus we can also calculate rough rejection rates by type
29of credit. These were much higher for unsecured debt (credit cards and consolidation loans) than
for secured debt (car loans and mortgages).
Table 2: Credit Market Access and Credit Constrained
Currently Currently Constrained Observations
unable to (of those who are (of sample)
borrow unable to borrow)
Not Employed 31.2% 13.1% 4.0% 1263
Employed 23.0 % 14.4 % 3.3% 1659
Total 26.5 % 13.8% 3.6% 2922
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
Table 3: Proportions Refused Credit or Discouraged from Applying
Applied Declined Not Full Got Later† Constrained Discouraged Constrained
for credit Amount (A) (B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2) + (3) − (4) (5) (A) +(5)
Base sample (1) (1) − (2) (2) + (3) (1) non-applicants sample
(sample) (sample)
Not 21.7 30.1 6.4 4.3 32.8 13.3 17.4
Employed (7.1) (10.4)
Employed 26.5 21.2 3.5 18.1 19.5 9.4 12.0
(5.2) (6.9)
Total 24.4 24.6 4.5 11.6 24.6 11.1 14.3
(6.0) (8.4)
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
†T h e r ea r eal a r g en u m b e ro fm i s s i n gv a l u e st ot h i sq u e s t i o n .W et r e a tt h e s ea san e g a t i v e
response. This is the only question to which there is signiﬁcant non-response.
Figure 7 illustrates the age patterns in our measures of credit access and credit constrained. The
age proﬁles are estimated by locally weighted (or local linear) regression. The top panel is based
on the ”subjective” questions. The fraction that report that they could not borrow falls with age
among the employed. Among the unemployed it falls initially and then rises again late in working
life. The fraction that are constrained (can’t borrow and would) falls with age for both the employed
and unemployed.
The lower panel of Figure 7 compares the measure of binding constraints based on the ”subjec-
30Table 4: Types of Credit Applied For and Outcome
Type of Credit Applied Unsuccessful
% of applicants % of applicants
for any credit
Mortgage 9.30 17.7
Car Loan 20.69 16.7
Equity Loan 0.30 0.0
Business Loan 4.35 13.8
Credit Card 9.45 41.3
Store Account 3.30 27.3
Line of Credit 6.45 18.6
Personal Loan 34.03 24.2
Consolidation Loan 5.70 57.9
Other 6.45 16.3
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job). Un-
successful means application declined or the applicant was not awarded full amount and
the applicant did not subsequently receive the loan. These calculations do not include
t h e1 %o fa p p l i c a t i n sf o rw h o mt h et y p eo fc r e d i tw a sn o ts p e c i ﬁed; and the numbers do
not include the 6% of applicants who applied for multiple sources of credit. )
tive” questions with the measure based on the ”Jappelli” questions (the broad measure including
the discouraged). It is important to note that the former refer to at the time of the interview, while
the latter refer to any time since the job loss. Quite naturally then, the ”Jappelli” questions suggest
a greater incidence of binding constraints at all ages. However, both measures of binding constraints
decline noticeably with age.
To examine the correlates of the responses to these questions in a multivariate setting, we esti-
mated a series of probit models. Predictor variables which we considered include characteristics of
the respondent (gender, age, education, marital status, visible minority status) and her household
(the presence of children); characteristics of the job separation (separation type, whether the job
loss was expected, and whether recall was expected) and ﬁnancial circumstance of the household
(whether they owned their home, had a mortgage, had liquid assets, had debt.) The results are
presented in Tables 5 through 7.
Table 5 presents empirical (probit) models of the response to the ”could borrow” question. We
have coded a negative response as a 1, so that these are models of the probability of a respondent
reporting that she is unable to borrow. This question refers to the point in time of the interview.
We have split the sample into those respondents who were not employed at the interview date (on





























































































(Would borrow if able)
Refused credit or 
“discouraged” since 
job loss
32the left) and those that were (on the right). For each sub-sample, we estimate a basic model and an
extended model. We report marginal eﬀects (calculated from the underlying probit coeﬃcients) and
the standard errors of those marginal eﬀects. Age is measured in decades and speciﬁed as a linear
spline with a knot at 45 years of age.
Starting with the sparser speciﬁcation, we see that, regardless of employment status, men are
less likely to be unable to borrow. Relative to the omitted group (less than a high school education),
high school graduates and especially university and college graduates report greater access to credit.
Married respondents with are also less likely to be unable to borrow. These eﬀects are economically
large as well as statistically signiﬁcant. For example, among the non-employed, those with a uni-
versity or college education have a probability of reporting that they are unable to borrow which is
14 percentage points lower than the base group (recall that the 31% of the unemployed report that
they are unable to borrow). Inability to borrow is more commonly reported by those with visible
minority status and less often reported by as respondent age past 45 years of age. However, these
eﬀects are only statistically signiﬁcant in the employed group.
Turning to the extended speciﬁcation, we see that some of the demographic eﬀects noted above
become weaker, but that the ﬁnancial circumstances of the households are strong predictors of their
ability to borrow. If a respondent’s household owned their homw, the household is much less likely
to report being unable to borrow. This eﬀect is substantially reduced if the household also has a
mortgage. Finally, holding liquid assets is a good predictor of being able to borrow.
The main lesson we draw from these results is that the ”subjective” responses about ability to
borrow correlate in sensible ways with characteristics of the respondents and their households. This
strengthens our belief that the apparent heterogeneity in access to credit is real.
In Tables 6 and 7 we turn from issue of whether a household could borrow to the issue of whether
they face (or have faced) a binding constraint. Table 6 examines the correlates of the measure based
on the subjective questions. Here a respondent is coded 1 if they report that they are unable to
borrow and would like to (and 0 otherwise). The format of the Table follows Table 5: the sample is
divided on the basis of employment at the interview date, and for each sample we estimate both a
basic empirical model and a richer speciﬁcation. All of the models are probit models and we report
marginal eﬀects and their standard errors.
33Relative to those that reported they could not borrow, a smaller fraction of the sample reported
that they were actually constrained, and here we ﬁnd fewer signiﬁcant predictors. However, educa-
tion remains important, and home ownership for those out of work.
Table 7 examines correlates of the measure of ”constrained” which is based on the ”Jappelli”
questions (the broad measure, including ”discouraged”). Since these questions refer to the entire
period since the initial job loss, we pool those who are currently working with those that are not.
In other respects, we follow the previous two tables: we estimated two probit models, a sparse
speciﬁcation and a richer empirical model, and report marginal eﬀects and their standard errors.
Once again the education eﬀects are quite strong. Binding credit constraints are more often
experienced by visible minorities, and less often by married respondents. Home ownership and
holding liquid assets reduces the probability of a binding credit constraint. Pre-existing unsecured
debt raises that probability.
To summarize then, two types of questions in the COEP survey document that not all job losers
have access to credit, and that a smaller fraction experience a binding credit constraint. While
the data are self-reports, the responses seem coherent in light of the responses to other questions
about household ﬁnances. The circumstances of job losers are heterogeneous: many indicate that
they could borrow to raise current consumption. This heterogeneity can be related to observable
characteristics. The data indicate that young workers, less educated workers and visible minorities
are more likely to be unable to borrow, and to experience a binding credit constraint.
5.2 Liquid Assets at Job Loss
Taken literally, our model suggests that the eﬀects of unemployment insurance depend on the liq-
uidity of retirement savings (and thus that there is an important complementarity in the design
of unemployment insurance and public pension systems.) However, as previously discussed, the
mandatory pension system in our model is really just a convenient way to vary the cost of savings,
and we intend it to be a metaphor for all variation in the cost of savings. There is good empirical ev-
idence based on the distribution of wealth (Samwick, 1998) and on consumption growth rates (Alan
and Browning, 2003) to support the idea that there is considerable heterogeneity in rates of time
preference. Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) demonstrate that changing needs (children)
can also vary the costs of savings. An important implication of the model is that heterogeneity in
34Table 5: Unable to Borrow (Probit)
Not Employed Employed
Male -0.064 (.037) -0.056 (.040) -0.048 (.029) -0.047 (.030)
Age 0.020 (.030) 0.078 (.033) -0.006 (.023) 0.024 (.024)
Age45 -0.093 (.095) -0.161 (.101) -0.159 (.081) -0.182 (.084)
High school -0.060 (.035) -0.060 (.037) -0.073 (.027) -0.056 (.028)
University or College -0.135 (.038) -0.127 (.041) -0.072 (.029) -0.047 (.032)
Spouse Present -0.126 (.039) -0.031 (.042) -0.073 (.032) -0.030 (.033)
Visible Minority 0.055 (.039) 0.072 (.042) 0.114 (.033) 0.099 (.034)
Children present ** 0.021 (.037) 0.027 (.039) -0.005 (.027) 0.00 (.028)
Quit -0.108 (.064) -0.008 (.060)
Fired -0.002 (.094) 0.095 (.101)
Ill 0.027 (.076) -0.117 (.042)
Expect job to end -0.004 (.035) -0.005 (.026)
Used UI in past 2 years -0.074 (.038) 0.005 (.027)
Strong Expectation of recall -0.016 (.053) -0.009 (.028)
Ownhome -0.278 (.052) -0.162 (.045)
Mortgage 0.120 (.051) 0.068 (.041)
Household had liquid assets -0.10 (.034) -0.10 (.025)
Household had other debt 0.026 (.034) 0.029 (.025)
Number of obserations 912 1245
R2 =0 .027.R 2 =0 .072. R2 =0 .030.R 2 =0 .030.
Mean = 0.31% Mean = 0.23%
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
Marginal eﬀects (standard error of marginal eﬀect). Dependent variable = 1 if the respondent self
reports that they could not borrow if needed, and = 0 otherwise. Question is asked at the ﬁrst
interview (in the 3 quarter after job end). See text for more details. Omitted categories are: less than
high school education, layoﬀ, no expectation of recall. Marginal eﬀects are calculated for the change in
a dummy variable from zero to one, at the means of all other variables. Numbers in bold indicate that
the underlying parameter is statistical signiﬁcant at a 10% level.
35Table 6: Would Borrow if Able (Probit)
Not Employed Employed
Male 0.002 (.014) 0.001 (.001) -0.004 (.011) 0.001 (.009)
Age -0.016 (.012) 0.000 (.012) -0.011 (.009) -0.003 (.008)
Age45 -0.009 (.044) -0.003 (.005) -0.038 (.038) -0.029 (.034)
High school -0.023 (.013) -0.001 (.001) -0.024 (.010) -0.016 (.009)
University or College -0.028 (.013) -0.002 (.001) -0.029 (.008) -0.021 (.008)
Spouse Present -0.036(.019) -0.001 (.042) -0.021 (.014) -0.007 (.011)
Visible Minority 0.033 (.019) 0.003 (.002) 0.025 (.015) 0.017 (.013)
Children present ** 0.016 (.015) 0.002 (.002) 0.005 (.010) 0.006 (.009)
Quit 0.001 (.004) -0.002 (.019)
Fired -0.007 (.010) 0.029 (.044)
Ill 0.014 (.012) -0.005 (.017)
Expected job to end -0.001 (.002) 0.001 (.009)
Used UI in past 2 years 0.002 (.001) 0.005 (.027)
Strong Expectation of recall -0.002 (.001) 0.004 (.010)
Ownhome -0.696 (.044) -0.051 (.026)
Mortgage 0.570 (.044) 0.014 (.019)
Household had liquid assets -0.002 (.001) -0.014 (.009)
Household had other debt 0.002 (.001) 0.018 (.008)
Number of obserations 912 1245
R2 =0 .023.R 2 =0 .162. R2 =0 .063.R 2 =0 .118.
Mean = 0.040% Mean = 0.033%
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
Marginal eﬀects (standard error of marginal eﬀect). Dependent variable = 1 if the respondent self
reports that they would borrow if they were able to, and = 0 otherwise. Question is asked at the ﬁrst
interview (in the 3 quarter after job end). See text for more details. Omitted categories are: less than
high school education, layoﬀ, no expectation of recall. Marginal eﬀects are calculated for the change in
a dummy variable from zero to one, at the means of all other variables. Numbers in bold indicate that
the underlying parameter is statistical signiﬁcant at a 10% level.
36Table 7: Credit Application Rejected or Discouraged (Probit)
Male -0.011 (.018) -0.001 (.017)
Age -0.043 (.014) -0.014 (.014)
Age45 -0.064 (.052) -0.050 (.051)
High school -0.019 (.017) -0.006 (.017)
University or College -0.060 (.018) -0.044 (.018)
Spouse Present -0.084 (.021) -0.039 (.020)
Visible Minority 0.059 (.021) 0.058 (.020)




Expected job to end 0.006 (.016)
Used UI in past 2 years 0.016 (.016)
Strong Expectation of recall -0.023 (.017)
Ownhome -0.123 (.028)
Mortgage ??.. 0.020 (.025)
Household had liquid assets -0.037 (.015)
Household had other debt 0.089 (.014)
Number of obserations 2157 2038
R2 =0 .040.R 2 =0 .093.
Mean = 0.15%
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job).
Marginal eﬀects (standard error of marginal eﬀect). Dependent variable = 1 if the respondent self
reports that they have had an application for crdedit declined or that they were discouraged from
applying at any time since job loss, and = 0 otherwise. Question is asked at the ﬁrst interview
(in the 3 quarter after job end). See text for more details. Omitted categories are: less than high
school education, layoﬀ, no expectation of recall. Marginal eﬀects are calculated for the change in
a dummy variable from zero to one, at the means of all other variables. Numbers in bold indicate
that the underlying parameter is statistical signiﬁcant at a 10% level.
37the cost of savings will be manifest in liquid asset holdings at job loss.
The COEP data collects information about liquid assets with the following questions:
• Do you or someone in your household have any assets that YOU could draw on if it was really
necessary? For example, money in the bank, savings bonds or RRSPs that are cashable, or
insurance policies, etc. Please do not include ﬁxed assets such as house, cars, boats, etc.
• Roughly how much do you have available in such assets?
The respondent is then asked how these quantities have changed since the date of the job loss.
This was followed by similar questions about debt:
• Apart from cars or mortgage, do you and your household have any other debts? Please think
of all sources such as loans and credit cards.
• Roughly how much debt apart from cars or mortgage do you have?
Again the level at interview and the change since job loss were collected, allowing us to calculate
the level at job loss.
Figure 8 presents the empirical cumulative distributions of liquid assets (top left), unsecured
debt (top right) and net position (assets - debt, bottom left). All refer to the time of job loss,
and are measured in months of usual household income. The ﬁrst point to note is that almost half
of job losers reported that their households had no such resources at the time of job loss. This
number is not incongruent with other evidence. Using the Canadian Survey of Financial Security
(a cross- sectional and representative survey of Canadian households), Morissette (2002) ﬁnds that
only about two thirds of those households that experienced some unemployment in the previous year
reported some ﬁnancial wealth. However, ﬁnancial wealth in that study is a broader concept than
our measure, and includes real assets such as boats and cars.
The second striking feature of Figure 8 is the heterogeneity in liquid assets at job loss. A quarter
of our sample reported that their household had liquid savings of more than three months of usual
household income. Similar heterogeneity was reported and emphasized by Gruber (2001).
The empirical cumulative distributions debt and for net positions have similar features: many
zeros and striking heterogeneity.
38The bottom right panel of Figure 8 shows, by age, the fraction of our sample having (at job loss)
(i) liquid assets amounting to at least one month of usual household income, (ii) unsecured debt
of at least one month of usual household income, (iii) both, (iv) neither. The fraction having only
debt falls with age, while the fraction having only assets rises. Interestingly, at all ages a nontrivial
fraction hold both liquid assets and unsecured debt.
The next step in our analysis is to consider the extent to which the observed heterogeneity in
liquid assets can be understood in terms of life-cycle considerations. As we have emphasized above,
holding liquid wealth is more costly if current income is low, or future income is expected to be high.
One important determinant of the timing of income is retirement provisions. All Canadian workers
participate in a public pension scheme (either the Canada Pension Plan or the Quebec Pension
Plan). However, this is only one component of retirement provision in Canada. Workers have, of
course, their own savings, and in addition many Canadians participate in (registered) pension plans
through their employer. These pension plans are a form of illiquid wealth. All else equal, it is more
costly for workers with such plans to hold a buﬀer of liquid assets, because contributions to thse
plans mean that their current disposable income is lower, and the payout of the plan means that
resources that they arrive at retirement with will have lower marginal value. In our sample, 38%
of report being covered by an employer administered pension in the job that ended.20 A second
life-cycle consideration is that it is more costly to hold a buﬀer of liquid assets when needs are high
(the current marginal utility of income of is high.) Needs are high when children are present in the
household. As Attanasio et al. (1999) emphasize, demographic eﬀects in intertemporal allocation
operate very much like variations in private discount rates.21
Figure 9 presents age proﬁles of ﬁnancial circumstances for workers losing jobs with and without
an employer sponsored pension (top panels) and with and without children present in the home
(bottom panels). The left hand panels present liquid assets at job loss (measured in months of usual
household income) while the right hand panel present net position (liquid assets - unsecured debt,
20Using data from a cross-sectionally representative survey (the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics), Morissette
and Drolet (2001) give the following estimates of pension coverage among paid workers in 1995: men aged 25-34, 45%;
men, 35-54, 67%; women, 25-34, 43%; women, 35-54, 54%. Given that the COEP samples from the ﬂow of job
separations, it oversamples younger and less educated workers (and less desirable jobs). Interestingly, Morissette and
Drolet note that pension coverage fell from 1984 to 1997 (except for older women) but that contributions to RRSPs
( liquid individual retirement accounts) rose substantially over the same period.




where B is the discount rate and Zt, is a set of demographics variables (Attanasio et al., 1999).
39again measured in months of usual households income).
In the top panel of Figure 9 we see that the for those without employer sponsored pensions, liquid
assets rise rapidly after age 45, presumably as these households accumulate household savings. This
is not true of workers with employer sponsored pensions, so that after age 45 a diﬀerence in liquid
asset holidngs opens up between the two groups.In the bottom panels we see that at every age,
households with children currently present (and thus with high current needs) hold smaller stocks
of liquid wealth.
Another obvious implication is a life-cycle framework is that households that anticipate a job-loss
should reduce consumption and increase savings. Our data include information on whether the job
loss was expected. Figure 10 illustrates that, at least among older workers, those who expected the
job loss had a larger buﬀer of liquid assets. There does not appear, however, to be any diﬀerence in
net positions. With all of this analysis it should be borne in mind that we are making cross sectional
comparisons.
Table 8 reports an attempt to model the eﬀects described in Figures 9 and 10 simultaneously,
while controlling for other characteristics of the household. The distribution of liquid assets holdings
in our data (again, measured as months of usual household income) has two important character-
istics: (i) a great many zeros, and (ii) the positives are very skewed.22 Our multivariate analysis
is therefore based on a ”two-part” model in which the probability of positive holdings is modelled
with a probit, and the quantity of holdings (conditional on positive holdings) is modelled with a
log-linear regression.23 We specify both components of the empirical model to include the same
conditioning variables. These include a gender dummy, a spline in age (with knot at 45), dummies
for highschool and college education, a dummy for spouse present, and a dummy for (self-reported)
visible minority status. To capture the eﬀects noted in Figures 9 and 10, we include a dummy for
children present and a dummy for expecting the end of the job. We also interact the intercept and
age proﬁle with a dummy for having an occupational pension in the job that was lost.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant gender eﬀects. There age proﬁle is statistically signiﬁcant in the quantity
(months) of liquid assets (conditional on postive) but not in the probability of having positive assets.
22The latter, for example, means that the normality assumption of a Tobit model is certainly violated.
23The two-part model diﬀers from the usual (Heckman) sample selection model in that the former assumes that
E[Y |X,Y > 0] is linear while the latter assumes that E[Y/X] is linear. (The two-part model of course implies that
E[Y/X] is non-linear.)
40Education has signiﬁcant eﬀects on both the probability of having liquid assets and in quantity of
assets conditional on positive. Respondents with spouse present are more likely to have positive
assets, and respondents who self-report visible minority status are both less likely to have positive
assets and have lower assets conditional on having any at all.
The presence of children signiﬁcantly reduces both the probability of having a buﬀer of liquid
assets and the quantity of assets conditional on positive. In this multivariate framework, expectation
of job loss appears to increase the size of liquid asset holdings conditional on having such a buﬀer,
but has no eﬀect on the probability of having a buﬀer. Finally, the pension-age interactions are
jointly signiﬁcant in the in the probit (for any assets) but not in the log-linear regression.
Table 8: Liquid Asset Holdings at Job Loss
Probit Regression
A>0 Log A |A>0
Male 0.000 (.026) 0.005 (.092)
Age 0.033 (.036) 0.374 (.118)
Age45 -0.027 (.107) -0.156 (.352)
High school 0.109 (.025) 0.296 (.095)
University or College 0.180 (.028) 0.391 (.108)
Spouse Present 0.085 (.028) 0.088 (.099)
Visible Minority -0.072 (.028) -0.230 (.103)
Children present -0.096 (.025) -0.260 (.09)
No Pension† -0.091 (.055) 0.086 (.194)
No Pension * Age† -0.030 (.044) -0.056 (.153)
No Pension * Age45† 0.155 (.136) 0.322 (.463)
Expected job to end -0.015 (.023) 0.177 (.081)
Number of obserations 2105 1187
Self-reports, 1995 COEP, 1st Interview (3rd quarter after separation from a job)
† Test of joint signiﬁcance of the pension variables: For probit, χ2(3) = 26.38,(Prob>
χ2) < 0.001 For regression, test of joint signiﬁcance of the pension variables:
F(3,1174) = 0.30,Prob > F =0 .828. Numbers in bold indicate that the underly-
ing parameter is individually statistical signiﬁcant at a 5% level. For probit, estimates
are marginal eﬀects (standard error of marginal eﬀect). For the discrete variables,
marginal eﬀects are calculated for the change in a dummy variable from zero to one,
at the means of all other variables. For the age variables, age is measured in decades.
41Figure 8: D i s t r i b u t i o no fA s s e t sa n dD e b t
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446C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have emphasized a series of related ideas. Unemployment insurance is more valuable
when self-insurance is more diﬃcult. Self-insurance is more viable when the cost of borrowing and
the cost of saving are low. The cost of savings depends on the timing of income and the timing of
needs, as well as private and market discount rates. Heterogeneity in any of these factors translates
into heterogeneity in the cost of saving and thus in the value of unemployment insurance.
We developed a life-cycle model to illustrate these connections. Then, using the model as a guide,
we examined empirical evidence on the extent of credit constraints and heterogeneity in the cost of
saving among job losers.
We found that among out of work job losers, 25% do not have access to credit markets. A smaller
fraction report being “constrained” in the sense that they would borrow if they could. However, the
possibility that credit constraints may bind in the future may be dampening the desire to borrow.
We also ﬁnd that there is substantial variation in buﬀer stock holdings at job loss. Life-cycle
circumstances that alter the costs of savings explain some of this variation. For example, holdings
of liquid assets that can be used to buﬀer employment shocks rise with age; are lower for households
with children (high needs); and are lower for households with (illiquid) pension wealth.
Our data contain workers for whom unemployment insurance likely has little value. Because
circumstances or other savings motives makes it easy for them to hold a buﬀer of liquid assets, or
because they have good access to credit markets, self-insurance is a reasonable option. For other
workers, this is not the case. A key implication of our analysis is that models that ignore such
heterogeneity may provide an incomplete guide to policy.
A life-cycle approach such as ours also suggests other important policy implications. For example,
an obvious implication is that the design of public pensions and public unemployment insurance
systems are interdependent. To the extent that public pensions mean that workers retirements
savings are unavailable to smooth a temporary income (either directly or as collateral) they may
make unemployment insurance more valuable. A second insight is that diﬀerential beneﬁts by family
type (for example, higher beneﬁts to families with children) may be desirable on insurance grounds
alone (with out reference to redistributional goals). This is because the cost of self-insurance, and
hence the value of unemployment insurance, may diﬀer across family types. Of course, this needs
45to be balanced against diﬀerences across family types in the extent of moral hazard.
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